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City of Las Vegas v. Evans, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 31 (May 02, 2013)1 
EMPLOYMENT LAW – Workers’ Compensation 
Summary 
 The court considered whether a firefighter who does not qualify for a presumption that 
his cancer is a compensable occupational disease may still seek to prove it is a compensable 
occupational disease without the benefit of the presumption.  The court also considered whether 
the appeals officer erred in awarding benefits in this case for a firefighter’s cancer. 
Disposition/Outcome 
 The court found that failing to qualify for a presumption that an illness is an occupational 
disease for workers’ compensation purposes does not preclude a finding that the disease is an 
occupational disease eligible for compensation through medical testimony.  The court also found 
that the appeals officer had not abused her discretion. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Evans was a fire fighter with the City of Las Vegas for four years before being diagnosed 
with cancer.  He responded to numerous fires and was exposed to carcinogens.  He filed for 
workers’ compensation benefits for his cancer but was initially denied.  He appealed to the 
Department of Administration Hearings Division, where a hearings officer also denied his claim.  
The hearings officer asserted that the normal standard of determining compensable occupational 
disease2 did not apply since there was a standard to presume that a firefighter’s cancer is 
presumed to be a compensable occupational disease.3  The hearings officer further asserted that 
the presumption did not apply to Evans since it required five years or more as a firefighter to 
come into effect4 and he had only been a firefighter for four years.   
 The appeals officer affirmed that the presumption did not apply.  But, after taking 
extensive medical testimony, found that the normal standard could apply and that Evans had met 
                                                
1 By Timothy A. Wiseman 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.440 (2011). 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.453 (2011). 
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.453(1) (2011). 
the burden of proof.  The city then appealed to the district court which declined to review the 
decision.  The city thus appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court arguing that only the 
presumption could apply and that the appeals officer had erred in saying that his burden had been 
met. 
Discussion 
 The Nevada Supreme Court, focusing on the plain meaning of the statute, declared that 
failure to qualify for a presumption that cancer was an occupational disease under NRS 617.443 
does not prevent a city employee from seeking compensation under the normal standard in NRS 
617.440 and NRS 617.358.  Rather, qualifying under NRS 617.443 would create a rebuttable 
presumption in the employee’s favor and failure to qualify for that presumption would merely 
require the employee to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the disease resulted 
from the course of their employment. 
 The court also considered whether the appeals officer abused her discretion in finding 
that the disease arose from Evan’s employment.  The court noted that it reviews only for abuse of 
discretion and does not substitute its own judgment for the original trier of fact.  It found that 
substantial medical testimony was adequately reviewed and that the appeals officer did not abuse 
her discretion. 
Conclusion 
 The court ruled that NRS 617.453 provides a rebuttable presumption that cancer is an 
occupational disease for those that meet its qualifications, but failure to meet its qualifications 
does not preclude a city employee with cancer from seeking workers’ compensation by proving 
through a preponderance of the evidence that it is an occupational disease.  Further, the appeals 
officer’s ruling that Evan’s cancer was a compensable occupational disease was supported by 
substantial evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. 
